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ABSTRACT 
OPERATING MARKET BASED REGULATION SERVICE 
USING SOFTWARE AGENTS COMPLIANT WITH  
NERC'S CONTROL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
Ramanujam Srinivasan 
 
 With the changing scenario for procurement of energy it becomes necessary to 
understand the process of obtaining energy from a diverse set of suppliers capable of 
providing substantial amounts of electric power at competitive prices. Sufficient insight has 
been gained in the energy brokerage system design and planning owing to experiences in 
the recently established markets especially the California market. It becomes contextual to 
analyze and understand the procurement of ancillary services, which are generally bundled 
as part of the wholesale energy supply chain, using a similarly competitive environment 
having a number of players that provide electric power for such services.  
 The objectives of this thesis are: (1) to provide a simulation package for 
conducting competitive auctions using software agents for the regulation service auction 
market, and (2) to demonstrate the compliance of a power system, employing Automatic 
Generation Control with parameters obtained from such a market, with North American 
Electric Reliability Council’s performance standards. The package employs a flexible and 
extensible Java-based agent development environment, MADKIT, to simulate the 
auctions for regulation service, and MATLAB/SIMULINK models with a fuzzy 
controller to simulate the power system. The framework is tested using a sample three-
area power system, where the parameters for regulation service in the second area are 
obtained from a competitive auction market. A bidding strategy based on fuzzy logic is 
also designed and tested for ensuring good profit for a bidding supplier in the auctions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
The power industry has been undergoing numerous changes over the past decade. 
Many of the changes are due to the modification of the “way things happen”.  The unified 
and regulated power sector has been transformed into a diversified and deregulated 
environment, where power can be traded like a commodity in the market. In the recent 
days, this scenario is effectively seen in the California power exchange market [1]. The 
previously vertically integrated utility system is now split into three major components: 
Generation companies (Gencos), Transmission companies (Transcos) and Distribution 
companies (Discos) enabling a competitive environment for provision of each of these 
services. Competitive markets for energy trading are being formed as part of the 
restructuring of the electricity supply industries. Since electricity is delivered 
instantaneously, it is obvious that a day-ahead market requires a balancing service with 
an associated real-time market [2]. In this context, the Ancillary Services market derives 
importance owing to the Independent System Operator’s responsibility to provide reliable 
power to the consumer along with maintaining system stability.  
Software agents have been employed for a wide variety of applications involving 
distributed computing and decision-making. An agent is a computer system situated 
within and as a part of an environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over 
time, in pursuit of its design objectives [3, 4]. In general, they possess the following 
characteristics: 
• Agents are autonomous, that is they act on behalf of the user, and goal-oriented. 
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• They contain some level of intelligence, from fixed rules to learning engines that allow 
them to adapt to changes in the environment. 
• They not only act reactively, but sometimes also proactively. 
• They can communicate and cooperate with other agents in a collaborative environment 
to solve complex tasks.  
Distributed control and decision-making is mainly useful when the components 
are geographically dispersed and there is more logic in keeping certain control decisions 
localized. The auction set up for the power market would be an ideal situation for 
application of distributed processing involving software agents to accomplish the 
decision tasks and design objectives of the participants in the market. Though sufficient 
scope and research exists in applying agents for the energy supply and demand market 
[5], the real-time energy balancing market for supply of Ancillary Services, such as 
operating reserves, regulation service and reactive power supply, has not matured enough 
to ensure perfect competition, and hence requires further investigation for the provision 
of such services.  
The objective of this thesis work aims at providing a framework for the ancillary 
services auction market for investigating the behavior of software agents representing the 
various participants including the auction coordinator or ISO (Independent System 
Operator) and simulation of the influence of such market behavior on the power system 
Load Frequency Control to ensure compliance with NERC (North American Electric 
Reliability Council) control performance standards. A simulation environment Madkit 
(Multi-Agent Development Kit), which simulates the agents in the Java virtual machine, 
is used to study the dynamics of the auction market as well as model the bidding 
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strategies for the agents competing for providing regulation service. The results of the 
hourly auctions are provided to the power system as participation factors for the winning 
bidders to provide regulation service. A fuzzy-logic based controller [6] is used along 
with a conventional PID controller for ensuring compliance with performance standards 
for the power system Automatic Generation Control (AGC). 
1.2 Outline 
The thesis is organized as follows.   
In chapter 2, a literature survey is presented, discussing the work done by other 
researchers in defining and elaborating the procurement process for energy and ancillary 
services in auction markets. The application of software agents to power systems stability 
as well as their use in the competitive procurement of energy from auction markets is also 
presented. 
In chapter 3, a description of the power market auction mechanism is given with 
emphasis on the need for such a market for ancillary services. An account of the 
techniques developed for energy procurement from the suppliers by the governing 
authority is provided. The concept of strategic bidding employed by suppliers to 
maximize profit from the market together with optimal use of resources is explained and 
an account of the costs incurred by bidding suppliers in the regulation service auction 
market is also given. 
In chapter 4, the software agents paradigm and its application to the regulation service 
scenario is presented. The environment details of the Madkit platform and its interface 
with Matlab are given. A detailed algorithm for conducting the auction for regulation 
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service using agents to represent the controller, who conducts the auction market, and the 
participants, who maximize their gain by bidding in the market, is provided.  
In chapter 5, a fuzzy logic based bidding strategy that could be adopted by the agents for 
success in the auction market is discussed and compared with a simple random number 
bidding strategy to complement its effectiveness in ensuring good profits for the bidding 
supplier.  
In chapter 6, simulation results of the proposed system on the Madkit platform for the 
agents, and Matlab/Simulink platform model for power systems compliance with the 
NERC standards using market-based data are presented.  
In chapter 7, the research conclusion is presented and recommendations are made for 
further work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter a literature survey of topics related to procurement of energy and 
ancillary services via auction markets, and application of software agents to power 
systems stability and energy marketplace is given. 
2.1 Work related to Energy Markets and Ancillary Services 
 Over the past decade, significant amount of research work has been done towards 
forming rules and procedures for deregulation and implementation of profound know-
how in the economic and technical areas of power systems. Different countries adopt 
different models of the electricity market applying various operating mechanisms. Sheblé 
[7] introduces various auction mechanisms for the deregulated power industry with 
detailed treatment of methodologies followed towards ensuring competition in all aspects 
of the industry. An introduction to power market design with significant emphasis on 
economic theory as applicable to energy trading markets is provided by Stoft [8]. The 
plan of deregulation is to achieve efficiency through competition. In a competitive 
market, suppliers adjust their output until marginal cost equals the market price and 
adjust the price until the market clears i.e., supply equals demand. 
Goran Strbac [9] explains the electricity trading set up in England and Wales, the 
basis for selecting the appropriate market or the combination of markets, and the types of 
ancillary services markets like reactive power service and frequency regulation service. 
There is a stress on the need for generation companies to quantify the value of various 
energy and ancillary services products in order to optimally allocate their activities in a 
number of competing markets. California [10], on the other hand, has established a 
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system with both pool operations, where all producers of power pool their energy into a 
central dispatching agency, which ensures dispersal of energy and revenue to the 
producers, and bilateral contracts, where producers and consumers of power come to 
mutual agreements about transfer of electric power and corresponding revenues. The 
California Power Exchange (CalPX) serves as a good example for understanding the 
decision process facing producers in the deregulated marketplace. Illic and Skantze [11] 
present a simplified account of the operating rules of the new energy marketplace, the 
challenges faced by the producers towards reliable operation and profit making, and the 
feasible risk management by the producers in the associated financial markets. From the 
perspective of the power systems stability and operability, Alvarado [12] examines the 
dynamics of power system markets considering single and multiple supplier and 
consumer scenarios. It is stressed that the stable well-behaved markets for electric power 
require consideration of the dynamics of those markets. The stabilizing price signal 
reflecting the energy error and effects of congestion on the equilibrium point for the 
market are discussed with simplifying assumptions on participant behavior and elasticity 
of the power demand.  
A simple, intuitive dynamic model for consumer/supplier response is presented by 
Meng et al [13] with the energy imbalance hypothesized as the key driving term for 
updating price. Numeric tests with various market update models, with detailed 
generator/turbine/ governor dynamics, are developed. Eigen-values are examined and 
stability regions are given for market-only dynamics and coupled system dynamics. 
However, network losses are ignored and a simple approximation is made equating the 
energy imbalance with the weighted sum of frequency errors. Chattopadhyay et al [14] 
 6
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
and Weber et al [15] consider inclusion of pricing scheme into the economic dispatch 
scheduling while using the price signal as a feedback (demand pricing and generation 
pricing) to both the importing side and exporting side, and only on the load side using 
Optimal Power Flow algorithm respectively. Load Frequency Control (LFC) technical 
issues with deregulation are examined by Christie et al [16] emphasizing the operational 
structures likely to result from deregulation.  
Papalexopoulos et al. [17] describe some challenging issues in the design of real-
time competitive market for electricity with deregulation. Two major forms of dispatch of 
energy are examined namely, Merit-Order dispatch, where power dispatch is based on a 
merit-order energy stack obtained by arranging the prices from the power suppliers in 
order, and Optimal Power Flow (OPF), where an Optimal Power Flow algorithm is used 
to determine power dispatched to the supplier units according to a Total Cost-
Minimization objective. Ancillary Services auction mechanisms, operational concerns, 
compliance of the participants towards committed deliverables, and various options for 
settlement are presented. It gives a good understanding of the underlying principles and 
procedures for competitive procurement of energy and support services.  Ilic et al. [18] 
provide the basic structure for a power exchange market structure for frequency control 
to enable purchasing and selling of frequency control as a well-defined commodity.  
Most of the above work has been focused on the basic structure for the primary 
energy market, while the ancillary services have been given less focus mainly due to the 
lesser quantity of sale and amount of profit that could be obtained from such a market. 
There are other researchers who have worked exclusively on bidding strategies in the 
competitive market to maximize supplier or consumer gains. In the auction-market based 
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bidding environment, the participant’s freedom to price away from the marginal 
production costs is utilized for increasing profit from the market. The notion of each 
participant about the system and other participants in the market is considered as 
estimates Lamont [19] and a sub-optimal bidding strategy is investigated for a two-player 
case. In a similar case, Shrestha et al. [20] present a strategic bidding with respect to 
ramp up rate of the power supplier where the power balance and spinning reserve 
requirement are considered simultaneously. A method is proposed to optimize the benefit 
of the supplier by fine-tuning its bids for ramp up rate and price while ensuring its 
success in the competition with other suppliers.  
Xiong et al [21] present an improved evolution based approach developed to 
evolve the bidding strategy and maximize the supplier’s profit in the long run. Based on a 
number of simple assumptions and simulations the authors have shown the feasibility of 
the proposed bidding strategy. Stochastic and ordinal optimization based formulations 
with assumptions of perfect competition are done by Wen, Zhang and Guan et al 
[22,23,24] where bidding strategies are developed considering expectations of other 
suppliers and the presence of a market regulator along with the application of Lagrangian 
relaxation technique for solving optimal power generation. Optimal bidding strategy 
considering probability of winning is examined by Hao [25] by solving differential 
equations that reflect the conditions for bidders to maximize their expected payoffs. A 
supplier would construct his bid as a function of his private cost and cost distributions of 
other bidders. Otero-Novas et al. [26] employ mixed integer programming to simulate a 
real wholesale electricity market. The expected bid prices and quantities, system hourly 
prices and generation schedules are estimated, taking into account the bidding strategies 
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of generators and the structure of the market. Application of fuzzy logic towards bidding 
strategies in a continuous double auction is presented by Leung and He [27], where the 
authors give an account of the heuristic fuzzy rules, prevalent techniques for changing the 
bidding strategy and a reasoning mechanism to find the best ask/bid for a hypothetical 
agent.  
Building on the effort described in [2], [6], [17], [18] for Load Frequency Control 
and market structure and [21], [27] for bidding strategies, a market structure for the 
procurement of Regulation Service in a competitive one-sided auction market with 
suppliers employing simple bidding strategies for success in supplying regulation service 
to an anticipated demand is presented in this thesis. 
2.2 Work related to Software Agents in Power Systems 
 Software agents have been in the power systems domain for quite some period 
owing to their inherent qualities that tie-up well with the distributed nature of the 
electrical system. Russell and Norvig [4] provide an excellent textual as well as 
simulation oriented explanation of agent technology with possible application scenarios 
and behavioral patterns of multi-agent systems. Ferber, Knapik, Weiss and Bond et al 
[28,29,30,31] provide an account of the prevalent techniques for analyzing, designing, 
and implementing multi-agent systems for a variety of applications including 
telecommunications, air-traffic control, telemetry in enterprise systems, and supply chain 
management. Reasoning about the state of the individual agent and its neighbors, 
interaction languages like KQML (Knowledge Querying and Manipulation Language), 
FIPA (Foundation of Intelligent Physical Agents) and KIF (Knowledge Interchange 
Format), implementation using object-oriented techniques, and typical structures and 
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applications are discussed. The realization of Distributed Artificial Intelligence or DAI to 
a problem at hand is visualized as an application of intelligent software agents. Warwick 
et al. [32] present many of the prevalent artificial intelligence techniques in power 
systems. An account of applications of evolutionary programming, fuzzy logic rule-based 
systems, neural network systems and interestingly hybrid systems, which are a 
combination of any/all of the aforementioned schemas of DAI is given with experiences 
from specific project environments along with relevant simulation results.  
 Woolridge [33] considers the problem of building a multi-agent system as a 
software engineering enterprise. His article focuses on specification, implementation and 
verification of such systems with reference to a number of case studies. Jennings et al. 
[34, 35] present a methodology for agent-oriented analysis and design considering the 
system to be developed as a computational organization with various interacting roles. 
Analysis is performed using a Roles model and Interaction model for the agents at the 
micro-level, while design uses the Agent model, Services model and Acquaintance model 
at the macro-level. The key concepts are roles, which have associated with them 
responsibilities, permissions and protocols. The methodology is illustrated with an 
example business process management system. At the website agentbuilder.com [36] a 
complete and comprehensive list of agent-building environments in the academic and 
commercial areas, along with a description and link to the web page of the corresponding 
project is provided. Amin [37, 38] explains the inherent complexity in both system 
maintenance and stable operation that has resulted from the effects of deregulation and 
restructuring of the energy industry. He illustrates the Electric Power Research Institute’s 
(EPRI) initiative to develop new tools and techniques to enable the power system 
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infrastructure to self-stabilize and maintain reliable operation when subject to failures and 
destabilizing occurrences, and suggests that agent-oriented technology will be well suited 
for such an application owing to its inherent distributed nature.  
 Application of intelligent software agents to stability analysis of power systems 
has also been prevalent in the literature. Kundur et al [39, 40, 41] provide good accounts 
of the various techniques like eigen-value analysis and transient stability analysis with 
loss of a line and cascading failures. The majority of the work for applying software 
agents to power systems stability analysis has been done by Talukdar and his team using 
Collaborative Networks [42, 43, 44]. Here, C-Nets are employed to solve complex 
problems by breaking them up into simpler problems and solving them using agents 
operating asynchronously. The Rolling Horizon Formulation (Model Predictive Control) 
is employed to break up the overall dynamic control task into a series of localized static 
optimization problems, each approximating a part of the total problem task. The agents 
communicate using a Collaboration protocol to find solutions to the overall problem. 
Prototypical networks illustrated include the array of pendulums and standard electric 
grid (IEEE 14 bus and 30 bus networks were chosen for the experiments).  
Getting to the field of power system simulations using software agents, Harp et al. 
[45] developed a proof-of-concept prototype tool, Simulator for Electric Power Industry 
Agents or SEPIA as an agent-oriented approach to solve complex tasks arising in the new 
power system operation. They illustrate the use of a simulation engine with a multi-agent 
system that takes care of business processes as well as control objectives. The system is 
based on component software technologies and runs on windows 32-bit platforms. In [46] 
the authors Lucas and Jahromi present a framework for agent-based operation of the 
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power market with buyers, sellers and a coordinator. The main emphasis in this work is 
finding the bidder agent commitment period, and the bidding time in the decision process 
of an agent submitting bids in a Dutch auction scenario. An algorithm is presented to 
determine bidder prices and amounts to enable market intelligent agents. Lam and Wu 
[47, 48] suggest use of Java technology for implementing multi-agent system for 
simulating electricity markets owing to object-orientation, platform-independence, 
support for distributed decision-making, communication among participants and interface 
with various software tools. A market simulator based on the California system has been 
designed and developed using the JATLite multi-agent template environment. Java API, 
JNI (Java Native Interface) is used to invoke native methods executing power system 
analysis and market analysis programs.  
Building on the effort described in [33], [34], [46], [47] for Multi-Agent Systems 
(MAS), an agent-based single-sided auction market controlled by an Independent System 
Operator (ISO) responsible for procuring Ancillary Services including regulation service 
to an anticipated demand is presented in this thesis. The Multi-Agent Development Kit or 
Madkit [49] environment developed using Java Beans™ Technology is used for creating 
the supplier and ISO agents and running the auction for regulation service every hour for 
a 24-hour period. The participation factors acquired by the suppliers are then utilized for 
maintaining the Area Control Errors of a three-area example system. 
MATLAB®/SIMULINK® [50] models are used for illustration of the compliance with 
North American Electric Reliability Council’s (NERC) performance standards using a 
Fuzzy-Logic based controller. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROCURING ENERGY USING AN AUCTION MARKET 
In this chapter, focus is given on the procurement of energy from an auction 
market, the terms associated with such a market, and the need for a similar auction 
scenario for providing ancillary services. The California ISO model is considered here as 
a primary reference for explaining the methodology for energy procurement as well as 
ancillary services procurement. A summary of the terms and expressions can be obtained 
from the glossary in order to understand their usage throughout the material. 
3.1 Market Structure and the CalPX 
 Most of the market structures used for trading power in the United States involve 
an auction mechanism to ascertain which generation units should be used to meet the 
demand. Some areas like California also allow for bilateral trades between load and 
generation. The California system consists of a Power Exchange (CalPX) to facilitate 
trading between GENCOs and ESCOs (Energy Service Companies that may be large 
industrial customers or customer pools acting to purchase power at the least cost when 
needed by the consumers) and serves as a good example for understanding the process of 
acquiring the required power from an auction market. A supplier wishing to sell power 
supplies a bid curve to the exchange that reflects the power delivering capacity of that 
supplier as a function of market price. Such bid prices are submitted on an hourly and 
day-ahead basis and a different bid curve may be submitted for each of the 24 hours of 
future operation. Similarly bid curves are obtained from consumers wishing to utilize 
power at corresponding prices.  
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The bids from either side are used to compile aggregate supply and demand 
curves for each hour. The intersection of the supply and demand curves determines the 
Market Clearing Price (MCP). Now, all supply bids with a price less than the MCP are 
accepted and those bidders are paid the MCP, while all demand bids higher than MCP are 
accepted and bidders are charged the MCP. Thus, the balance is ensured between supply 
and demand and the PX remains revenue neutral. Figure 3.1 provides a pictorial 
illustration of the relationship between the bidding entities in the market and the 
governing entities. With this organizational structure in place there exist other variations 
and types of markets for procuring energy.  
 
Power Exchange 
Or ISO 
GENCO IPP 
ESCO 
DISCO 
Others 
Bilateral 
Contracts 
Brokers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Organizational Structure of the power market 
 Among the various market structures are the markets that include cash, futures, 
planning and swap markets. The cash market undertakes trading in spot market that 
reflects real-time power trading and forward contracts that reflect trading for power 
interchange at a future time The futures market facilitates trading of what are termed as 
futures and options, which are a means of risk management in power trading. While the 
planning market is intended towards trading of contracts aimed at system expansion, the 
swap market establishes trading between markets when the participants desire conversion 
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from one type of contract to another. Further explanation and investigation of these 
markets and the relations between them is beyond the scope of this work. 
3.2 Bidding Strategies 
 There exist a number of ways in which the participating suppliers of energy 
namely Independent Power Producers (IPP), Generation Companies (Gencos) or any 
other producers capable of selling their power can maximize their net worth or profit 
from the auction market. Also, in a dual auction environment, there exist consumers, who 
can be large industrial entities, Distribution Companies (Discos) or any other consumers 
capable of buying their required power from the market. These consumers of electric 
power can also implement simple, intuitive bidding strategies or intelligent, elite 
strategies based on gaming theory and optimization to increase the benefit they would 
obtain from the auction market.  
 The ISO or PX would implement an optimization algorithm to dispatch the bids in 
an efficient manner based on maximum social benefit, least cost formulation or least loss 
formulations. Among the various methods employed by the participants in the auction the 
most prominent would be optimization-based techniques that aim at maximizing or 
minimizing an objective function that characterizes the cost or benefit function of each 
individual participant in the auction. This function could very well be one that reflects the 
variable costs associated with fuel procurement and O & M (Operation and Maintenance) 
costs. These methods are generally termed as bidding strategies aimed at maximizing the 
benefit to the bidder from the competitive set up.  
 Microeconomic theory holds that the optimal bidding strategy [5] for a supplier is 
to simply bid marginal cost. When a generator tries to exploit imperfection in the market 
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to increase its profit from the market, it is said to employ strategic bidding. Among the 
various ways to employ strategic bidding, probabilistic methods and fuzzy methods of 
estimating bid values or behaviors of the other participants in the market are among the 
prominent techniques. 
The market operator generally employs a merit-order based dispatch procedure, or 
an optimal power flow (OPF) based dispatch procedure, to procure power from the 
participants in the supply side, which is the side with greater competition among the 
bidders. Several citations [15, 19, 22] can be offered from the literature describing the 
nuances and procedures involved in these mechanisms, which have proven quite effective 
in achieving their primary purposes of procuring electric power in a competitive manner. 
The main idea here is to understand the existence of several methods to procure power 
from bidding suppliers and briefly preview the objective function based techniques. 
Similar techniques, often simpler in nature, are employed to procure power for balancing 
services such as regulation, spinning reserves and replacement reserves using competitive 
auction markets. 
3.3 Auction market for Ancillary Services 
 Since electricity is delivered instantaneously, it is obvious that a day-ahead 
market requires a balancing service with an associated real-time market. In this context, 
the Ancillary Services market derives importance owing to the ISO or Independent 
System Operator’s responsibility to provide reliable power to the consumer along with 
maintaining system stability. The ISO must ensure that there is sufficient capacity among 
available generators to participate in the real-time market and secure enough reserve 
capacity to keep the system operating reliably. Though sufficient scope and research 
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exists in applying agents for the energy supply and demand market, the real-time energy 
balancing market for supply of Ancillary Services, such as operating reserves, regulation 
service and reactive power supply, is not mature enough to ensure perfect competition 
and hence requires further investigation for the provision of such services. . Such a 
separate reserve auction is better in the market structure where the ISO does not have any 
direct bondage with the Power Exchange (PX), which takes care of the functioning of the 
forward energy market.  
Considering a one-sided auction for regulation service the following section 
examines the costs and payments the bidding suppliers are entitled for setting aside a 
portion of their capacity for such service. 
3.3.1 Capacity Reservation and Energy Prices 
 Generators provide Automatic Generation Control (AGC) services by reserving a 
portion of their unloaded capacity for use in real-time by the ISO, and these can be made 
available within a 10-minute period. There are two types of costs associated with such 
markets where capacity is reserved in advance and later dispatched in real time. These 
include the opportunity costs associated with providing the service and the actual cost 
incurred during real-time dispatch of power.  
 The general cost function used for studies is a quadratic approximation of the total 
costs involved in providing power by the bidder ‘i’ that would include fixed costs for 
infrastructure as well as variable costs for fuel procurement and Operation and 
Maintenance costs.  
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This function is given by: 
( )[ ]2**)( giigiiigii PPPC γβα ++=                      (3.1) 
 iii γβα ,, : are constants that reflect approximated cost parameters. 
An infra-marginal unit incurs an Opportunity Cost (cost of an opportunity lost to 
bid in the real-time market for energy) for providing regulation service since it is 
constrained by ramp-rate limitations. Hence, there occurs a need to provide for the 
opportunity costs in the bids submitted by such units in the auction in terms of a Capacity 
Reservation Bid ( ). In the case of AGC, a unit is required to operate above its 
minimum output in order to allow movement in upward and downward directions. Since 
no unit would prefer to operate at higher levels when the market price is lower than its 
costs, it is entitled to bid for a capacity payment to cover the actual costs the unit may 
incur during operation. 
iR
The value of reservation capacity bid,  is given by iR
( ) ( )niTrR iiii ...1;2 =∗∗∗+= γβ             (3.2) 
Where  
n: the number of participating bidders 
ir : the ramping rate of the unit (MW/min) 
 T: the ramping time given by ISO (Minutes) 
ii γβ , : The values in the cost function Ci(Pgi) 
This  reflects the opportunity cost incurred by the unit in providing regulation service 
limited by its ramp-rate. 
iR
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The other cost associated with the bidding is the Energy Bid ( ), which is the 
general cost function of the bidding entity. Successful bidders from the auction are paid a 
capacity reservation payment that reflects their opportunity costs, and also paid for power 
if they provide it during real-time. 
iE
The value of the energy bid,           iE
( )niPgiE iii ...1;**2 =+= γβ        (3.3) 
This actually reflects the Marginal Cost incurred by the unit in providing power Pgi. 
With these two costs incurred by the bidders, the auction considered here takes into 
account a two-part bid for deciding the successful bidders and the MCP.   
3.3.2 Participation Factors for the bidders 
 During the operation of AGC (Automatic Generation Control), each generator is 
required to provide some amount of power for the service in a particular control area to 
maintain the frequency within the required limits. In other words, each generator is 
required to participate in the frequency regulation service according to a pre-determined 
level along with the other generators in the control area. This is referred to as the 
participation factor of the generator in providing regulation service. As illustrated in 
Figure 3.2, an auction market, where the GENCOs compete to procure more participation 
in the service by strategic bidding, could determine the participation factors. 
 In an auction set up, the participation factor would be determined for each bidding 
hour by dividing the allocation done for each successful supplier from the outcome of the 
corresponding hour-auction by the forecasted demand for regulation for the particular 
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period. The forecasted demand is generally determined by examining historical data for 
the hour of operation and also by studying the weather trends and consumer behaviors. 
For each hour in the auction market, corresponding participation factors are obtained for 
each the successful bidders who are paid the Market Clearing Price. These factors are 
later used during the actual dispatch hour of the next day when there is a need to actually 
provide power for regulation of frequency in the control area. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOFTWARE AGENTS BASED AUCTION MARKET FOR 
REGULATION SERVICE  
 In this chapter, the important details of the solution environment for simulating 
regulation service auctions using software agents are provided. While the first section 
explains the Agent Group/Role model and the agent-based software engineering approach 
for this market, the ensuing sections explain the algorithm executed for running the 
auction and procuring service by the controller agent. 
4.1 Agent Architecture for Collaboration 
Some of the qualities to be present in an agent development platform for agent 
collaboration and cooperation are:  
• Need for a robust communication environment for ease of message transfer among 
the agents. 
• Need to work together to achieve some predefined global objectives while completing 
their local operations. 
• Need to use a generic, customizable and scalable platform. 
• Modular construction in order to define and simulate working of the agent quickly. 
• Ease of work with respect to using Agent Communication Languages – No emphasis 
on a specific ACL. 
An auction market implementation would be close to a Decision Making System 
composed of agents performing corresponding roles in the automated system for the 
entities in the real world system [33]. The agent specifications should be capable of 
capturing at least the following information: 
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• The beliefs the agents have; 
• The ongoing interactions the agents have with their environment and among 
themselves; 
• The goals that agent will try to achieve; 
• The actions that agents perform and the effects of these actions. 
Auctions are similar to a Contract-Net Protocol application, where a manager agent 
with a task to perform puts it out to tender to a number of contractors agents. The 
contractors willing to perform the task return bids to the manager that are evaluated by 
the manager according to some criteria, and the contractor with the best bid is allocated 
the task. It is however important to identify the flow of information among the agents. It 
would be useful to adopt the Agent/Group/Role model [34] as shown in figure 4.1 to 
define the various participating agents and their roles in the regulation market. Object-
oriented analysis and design can be performed identifying each agent as an actor 
performing tasks to achieve its design objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Agent/Group/Role model 
 22
CHAPTER 4 SOFTWARE AGENTS BASED REGULATION SERVICE   
The Group is an identifiable entity that consists of Agents, which are members 
handling one or more Roles defined within the group. While there can be more then one 
agent performing the same role within a group, there cannot be two roles for the agent 
with identical nomenclature and definitions.  
There is a perception to view an organization as a collection of roles that have 
specified relationships with one another and hold systematic interactions with other roles. 
Collections of roles are aggregated into groups and an agent can hold distinct roles in 
many groups. While an agent is considered as an active communicating entity, the group 
is a means of agent aggregation and the role is an abstraction of an agent function, service 
or identification within a group. 
4.2 Madkit and its Interface with Matlab 
  Madkit [49] is a versatile agent development platform built using the Java 
Beans specification and the agent/group/role paradigm. It is a generic, highly 
customizable and scalable with a goal of providing a foundation layer for various agent 
models, and to make the basic services extensible and replaceable. It is a set of Java 
classes that implements the agent kernel, the various libraries of messages, probes and 
agents. It includes a graphical environment and many system and demonstration agents. 
The platform has three basic design principles (Figure 4.2): 
• Micro-kernel architecture 
• Agentification of services 
• Component model for graphical interface 
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The idea is to provide a modular development environment with minimum 
resource requirements for building customized agent applications with no work from the 
developer towards system activities. The developer need only to concentrate on the 
architecture, goals, and other application aspects for the agents without having to look 
into communication, addressing and other services.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Madkit Architecture for Agent Development 
The interface between Madkit and Matlab is established using the JMatLink 
software Java class library [51] that provides a .dll file to call Matlab routines. The basis 
of this function is the Java Native Interface (JNI) method declaration within the JMatLink 
class and the corresponding C language implementation calling Matlab routines. The 
‘mex’ file utility is used to enable C language syntax commands to call Matlab 
commands and execute them inside the Matlab engine previously invoked using the 
engOpen() method. With calls to Matlab computational scripts and functions from the 
agent bean in Madkit, a lot of additional functionality can be implemented into the 
agents. 
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4.3 Auction Market for Regulation Service 
The reserve auctions differ in a number of ways from the regular energy auction 
market. While the main aim of the PX auction is to facilitate trade of electricity between 
buyers and sellers, the procurement of ancillary services is the sole responsibility of the 
ISO, which “reserves in advance” a portion of the unloaded capacity of the participating 
bidders. The ISO pays the successful bidders for the reserved capacity as well as for the 
energy used during run-time for energy balancing.  
4.3.1 The Auction Process 
The implemented market structure assumes that there exists a separate market for 
regulation service. The ISO procures regulation service from bidding suppliers in the 
following steps: 
• Each of the bidders submits an Energy Bid ( ) in $/MWh and a separate 
Reservation Capacity Bid ( ) in $/MW to the ISO at the beginning of each auction 
for the corresponding hour during the next day. 
iE
iR
• After receiving all the bids, the ISO builds what is called the “Energy Stack” in which 
the bids are arranged in ascending order of bid prices. In this implementation the sum 
of both parts of the bid is used while building the energy stack. 
• The forecasted demand or required capacity is filled starting from the lowest price 
point on the stack working upwards until the capacity needed is satisfied. 
• The last price at which the required capacity is filled is termed as the “Market 
Clearing Price (MCP)” in $/MW. 
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• The successful bidders are the ones below the MCP in the energy stack and are paid 
their capacity bids initially to compensate for their opportunity costs. Their energy 
bids are the amounts paid to them when they are called upon to provide energy at run-
time. 
A pictorial representation of the auction process is shown in Figure 4.3. The 
bidders compete against each other in the open market to secure a position in the dispatch 
stack and deliver as much power as possible as a profitable price. In this context, the 
bidding strategy employed by the bidder plays a significant role in ensuring success for 
the bidder. 
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Figure 4.3: Auction Market for Regulation Service 
Among the different ways in which payments are paid to the suppliers we have 
considered payment for the reserved capacity and run-time dispatch. The outputs of the 
auction are: 
• The Market Clearing Price. 
• The Reservation Capacity Price C  given by i
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i
EMCP
i
C −=                                (4.1) 
where 
MCP: the Market Clearing Price from the energy stack for the bid-hour 
    : the Energy Bid of the successful bidder for the bid-hour iE
• The participation factor for each successful bidder unit in the regulation service 
during that bid-hour of operation during the next day given by: 
hourthefordemandregulationforecastedTotal
hourtheforbiddertheforallocatedCapacityfp =.        (4.2) 
In this implementation, there occur two payments made by the ISO to the 
successful bidders, one for the regulation reserved capacity, which is the MCP from the 
auction results, and another paid in real-time when the unit is called for supply of 
regulation power, which is nothing but the energy bid of the bidder during the auction. 
The reserved capacity price is , and the real-time price is the energy ‘strike’ price . iC iE
The auction market participants can be implemented as Supplier agents and ISO 
agent over an Internet Protocol (IP) network. The computation complexity can be 
embedded into the agents to reveal the actual calculations done by the suppliers in 
providing bids to the ISO controller. This approach would be more pragmatic since 
bidders could be geographically distributed in a real-life situation. 
4.3.2 Run-Time Dispatch and Actual Payment 
 It would be a good assumption to consider that the suppliers are price takers in the 
auction market, where they cannot set the real-time of their commodity and have to 
accept the resultant price from the auction. The successful bidders in the auction market 
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are called for supplying power for regulation service at run-time according to the order of 
the bids in the dispatch stack, i.e., the lower the energy bid of the bidder the better is the 
chance for calling upon that bidder to supply at run-time.  
For the sake of simplicity of agent implementations a competitive auction 
scenario for the suppliers has been considered and the agents do not deal with issues such 
as uninstructed deviations and subsequent settlements. The successful bidders in each 
hour auction are paid the MCP from that auction for their capacity reservation initially. 
When called upon for dispatch at run-time the generators receive additional strike price 
payment according to their energy bid during the auction. This is the form of 
implementation in the California market [10] and has been adopted for the agent 
simulation and auction automation process in this work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FUZZY SYSTEM DESIGN FOR BIDDING STRATEGY AND 
COMPLIANCE WITH NERC STANDARDS  
In this chapter, the two types of bidding strategies implemented to improve the 
profit obtained by the supplier agents in the auction market are explained. While the first 
section explains the Fuzzy Logic based Bidding Strategy, which proves to be effective in 
ensuring good profits for its agent, the second section explains the design of the Fuzzy 
Controller that ensures compliance with NERC’s performance standards for the operating 
power system. Figure 5.1 shows a snapshot of the simulation performed on Madkit. With 
the strategies in place, it provides an opportunity to study the working of the market when 
each of the bidders chooses a different strategy for making more profit from the market 
or enters the dispatch stack after a failed attempt.  
 
Figure 5.1: Snapshot of simulation using Madkit platform 
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5.1 Uniform Random Number based Bidding Strategy 
 The profit obtained by a successful supplier agent depends upon the extent to 
which its bid price is lower in the dispatch stack. In the random number strategy a 
random number is initially generated that follows a uniform gaussian distribution [21]. 
This number is then added or subtracted from the previous value of the bid amount 
depending upon the corresponding success or failure of the supplier agent to find a place 
in the final dispatch stack formulated by the ISO. The simple formula is given by: 
eP
new
P ±=
0           (5.1) 
Pnew: the new bid price ($/MW) 
P0: the original bid price ($/MW), value over which bid price is changed 
e: the uniform random component 
 The randn(1) function in Matlab is used to generate the random number and add it 
to the original bid price if the agent has some profit or reward from the previous auction 
and subtract it from the original bid price if the agent did not have any profit in the 
previous auction. The randn(1) function generates a random number that follows a 
uniform distribution with mean 0, variance = 1, and standard deviation 2σ σ  = 1. This 
strategy, however, has a static nature with a random number being simply added or 
subtracted without utilizing the extent of profit made by the agent. 
5.2 Fuzzy Inference System based Bidding Strategy 
 This strategy employs a Fuzzy Inference System developed in Matlab using the 
Mamdani-type fuzzy system. There is one input (profit value) and one output (price 
change value). The membership functions for the input reward and output price change 
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function are given in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 respectively. The output is varied 
according to the extent to which the input profit characterizes over the input membership 
functions. 
The membership functions and rule base are created using the fuzzy inference 
system editor in Matlab, which produces an output structure having all the attributes to 
execute the fuzzy bidding strategy. 
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Figure 5.2: Input Membership Functions 
 The input membership functions describe the extent of spread of the reward or 
profit obtained by the successful supplier over the input space spanning until a value of 
700. The behavior of the fuzzy inference system would be altered when the input space is 
changed to span a different set of values providing scope for further investigation of the 
performance of the system over different sets of input spaces. 
 31
CHAPTER 5 FUZZY SYSTEM DESIGN   
 
 
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PriceChange
D
eg
re
e 
of
 m
em
be
rs
hi
p
veryless less medium high veryhigh
 
Figure 5.3: Output Membership Functions 
The rule-base for computing the fuzzy rules for processing the input to produce 
the output is given in Table 5.1. This explains the rules used to transform the extent of 
profit obtained by the bidder into a corresponding extent of price change to ensure 
success as well as sustained profit for the bidder. Similar to the input membership 
functions, the output membership functions describe the extent of spread of the price 
change made for the successful supplier over the output space spanning until a value of 
15. Hence, the behavior of the fuzzy inference system would be altered when the output 
space is changed to span a different set of values influencing the performance of the 
fuzzy system.  
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Table 5.1: Fuzzy Logic Rules for Bid Change 
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Finally, figure 5.4 shows the surface plot of the fuzzy system, which pictorially 
represents the relationship between the input and the output of the FIS. 
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Figure 5.4: Surface Plot of the Fuzzy Inference System 
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5.3 Fuzzy controller design for NERC standards compliance 
Each control area is required to monitor its control performance and report its 
compliance with CPS1 and CPS2 to NERC at the end of each month [2]. The control 
structure implemented is a PID type controller whose control parameter is tuned by the 
fuzzy rules. Specifically, when there is high compliance with CPS1, the control 
parameter is gradually reduced to diminish high-frequency movement in the speed 
governor’s equipments. Once there is low compliance the control parameter is raised up 
accordingly. This ensures compliance with standards as well as reduced wear and tear of 
equipment. 
The input for the fuzzy logic rules is the information that reflects compliance with 
CPS1 and CPS2. The FIS system will lower the control parameter of the PID controller 
of the secondary loop of load frequency control when the value of either input rises. On 
the other hand, the parameter will be increased when the value of either input reduces. 
The first input to the fuzzy system is the cumulative average compliance factor 
(CFac) used to find compliance with CPS1 given by: 
[ ]1CFAVGCF YXac →=          (5.2) 
[ ]1CFAVGCF ZX →=          (5.3) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Time period for determining compliance 
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The other input is the 10-minute window average of ACE divided by L10 
(AVG10 [ACE]/L10) used to find compliance with CPS2. Both the inputs are calculated 
every one-minute for firing the fuzzy logic output, which is the fuzzy gain (α ) used to 
tune the gain control parameter of the PID controller as shown in figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Operation of the fuzzy controller 
The input membership functions for the fuzzy controller are shown in figure 5.7 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Input membership functions for the fuzzy controller 
The input membership functions for the fuzzy controller are shown in figure 5.8 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Output membership functions for the fuzzy controller 
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The Fuzzy Rules for inferring the output from the input is shown in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Fuzzy Logic Rules for controller gain inference  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, figure 5.9 shows the surface plot for the fuzzy controller 
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Figure 5.9: Surface plot for the fuzzy controller 
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CHAPTER 6 
SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 In this chapter, the details of the NERC performance standards and the 
Matlab/Simulink model for a three area power system with a fuzzy logic controller for 
ensuring compliance is presented followed by interaction between the market and the 
power system. Simulations and results are next presented that show bidder performance 
during two sets of auctions with the fuzzy strategy. The simulation results of the power 
system and plots of CPS1 and CPS2 that ensure compliance with NERC standards are 
later presented. 
6.1 FIS based Regulation Service Compliant with NERC Standards 
Regulation service provided by the generation companies (Gencos) is required to 
track the fluctuations in power demand of distribution companies (Discos) to keep good 
reliability, and to meet the North American Electric Reliability Council, NERC’s 
performance standards namely CPS1 and CPS2 [6]. Fuzzy logic based controller is 
developed for ensuring compliance with the performance standards for a test system with 
three control areas and corresponding regulation loads. The signals, which determine 
compliance, are used as input to the fuzzy controller, which adjusts the output of a PID 
controller by a factor to administer compliance. 
Each control area is required to monitor its control performance and report its 
compliance with CPS1 and CPS2 to NERC at the end of each month. The control 
structure implemented is a PID type controller whose control parameter is tuned by the 
fuzzy rules. Specifically, when there is high compliance with CPS1, the control 
parameter is gradually reduced to diminish high-frequency movement in the speed 
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governor’s equipments. Once there is low compliance the control parameter is raised up 
accordingly. This ensures compliance with standards as well as reduced wear and tear of 
equipment. 
6.1.1 CPS1 and CPS2 
 CPS1 is defined as follows: Over a sliding 12-month period, the average of the 
“clock-minute averages” of a control area’s ACE divided by “ten times its area frequency 
bias” times the corresponding “clock-minute averages of the interconnection frequency 
error” shall be less than the square of a given constant, 1ε , representing a targeted 
frequency bound. 
This is expressed by: 
( )1.6211
1
1212 10
ε≤

 ∆×


−= FB
ACEAVGCF monthsmonths
Where  ε1:  the targeted frequency bound   
 (.) 1:  refer to 1-min. averages 
∆F: interconnection frequency error 
Bi:  frequency bias of the ith control area in MW/0.1Hz 
To calculate the frequency-related parameter, CPS1 a compliance factor (CF) and 
1-minute average compliance factor are introduced namely: 
][ 112 CFAVGCF month−=   ; 






 ∆


−= 12111
*
10 ε
F
B
ACECF    (6.2) 
Then CPS1 is obtained from the following equation: 
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CPS1 = (2 – CF) * 100%                   (6.3) 
To comply with NERC, CPS1 should be less than 100%. 
 CPS2 requires the 10-minute averages of a control area’s ACE (Area Control 
Error) to be less than a constant (L10) given in the equation: 
( ) 10min10 LACEAVG ≤          (6.4) 
Where  
( )( )BsBL i 101065.1 1010 −−∗= ε          (6.5) 
∑
=
=
n
i
is BB
1
             (6.6) 
Bs: the sum of the frequency bias settings of all control areas 
10ε : the targeted frequency bound for CPS2 
The targeted frequency bounds considered here are mHz20.61 =ε and mHz64.010 =ε . 
CPS2, which should be greater than or equal to 90%, is given by: 
( )7.6%10012 ×


−−= monthmonth
month
PeriodseUnavailablPeriodsTotal
ViolationsCPS
 
Where Violationsmonth are a count of the number of periods that the clock-10-minute 
averages of ACE are greater than L10 in one month. 
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6.2 Sample Three Area System and Market Interaction 
 We consider a sample three-area power system as shown in figure 6.1 with the 
second area consisting of bidding agents implementing the market structure for regulation 
service. The outcome of each hour auction would be participation factors for each of the 
generators to provide regulation service. 
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Figure 6.1: Sample Three-Area System 
The synchronizing power coefficients of the lines are  
T12 = 50 MW/rad, T13 = 200 MW/rad, and T23 = 120 MW/rad. 
The random components of the load are the entities that need to be compensated 
by the regulation service and hence are simulated in the model using controlled random 
noise signals. A vector alpha consists of participating factors of the 5 Gencos in area-2 
for regulation service during any particular hour of operation. Appendix A provides a 
snapshot of the Simulink models and fuzzy controller. 
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6.3 Auction Market Simulation 
 In this section, the agent based auction system is simulated for regulation service 
for the 24-hour period of the next day. An auction consisting of 5 Supplier agents is 
assumed to be present along with an ISO Controller agent. An array consisting of 24 
elements is assumed to provide the forecasted regulation requirement for each hour in the 
24-hour operation period for the next day. The sum of the capacity bid and energy bid is 
considered for building the energy stack by the ISO. Table 6.1 shows the parameters of 
the five bidders, their Reservation Capacity Bids ( ) and Energy Bids ( ). With these 
parameters for the individual supplier agents, the Madkit platform is used to simulate the 
auction market. 
iR iE
 The reward for each successful supplier is given by: 
( ) ( )bidderforAllocationBidpriceMCPreward ∗−=            (6.8) 
Table 6.1: Parameters for the units in the simulation 
Unit Ramp-Rate 
 
MW/min 
Ri 
 
$/MW 
Ei 
 
$/MWh 
 
1 
 
10 
 
8.552 
 
10.01 
 
2 
 
9 
 
7.895 
 
8.198 
 
3 
 
10 
 
8.552 
 
10.01 
 
4 
 
6 
 
8.795 
 
9.147 
 
5 
 
8 
 
8.565 
 
9.513 
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The bar chart in figure 6.2 shows the forecasted demand values for the 24 hours 
considered for regulation auction. 
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Figure 6.2: Plot of forecasted regulation demand 
For the purpose of simulation, at the end of each hour auction, the ISO agent calls 
a BidPrice agent, which invokes the bidding strategy routines in Matlab for each of the 
agents. The changed bid prices from Matlab are again fetched by the BidPrice agent and 
sent to the Supplier agents, who participate in the next hour auction. This cycle continues 
until auctions for the 24 hours. In the first example, the second supplier agent is chosen to 
implement the fuzzy bidding strategy while the other agents implement the random 
number bidding strategy.  
The bar chart in figure 6.3 and 6.4 show the number of successful bidders during 
the first and second sample runs of 24-hour auctions respectively. 
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Figure 6.3: Plot of number of successful bidders in First Sample Run 
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Figure 6.4: Plot of number of successful bidders in Second Sample Run 
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The rewards for each of the five agents in the first sample simulation are plotted 
in figure 6.5. The areas under the reward plots for each of the individual agents are 
$3389.3, $6654.2, $2598.0, $1108.6 and $1571.6 respectively in the order supplier 
agent1 to supplier agent5. It is observed that the second supplier agent with the fuzzy 
bidding strategy has been able to make maximum profit from the auction by adjusting its 
bid price value being sensitive to the extent of change in the reward value. This ensured 
that the bidder was not only made good profit but was also in the stack of successful 
bidders for the maximum number of times. 
For the second sample simulation, the bidding strategy of Supplier 3 was changed 
to be FIS strategy and that of Supplier 2 changed to the other strategy to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the FIS strategy. A second 24-hour auction was conducted following the 
first one with the changed bidding strategy options. The rewards for each of the five 
agents in the second sample simulation are plotted in figure 6.6. The areas under the 
reward plots for each of the individual agents are $1595.8, $1752.8, $3909.2, $1670.9 
and $2327.9 respectively in the order supplier agent1 to supplier agent5. 
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Figure 6.5: Plot of Rewards for Bidders in First Sample Run 
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Figure 6.6: Plot of Rewards for Bidders in Second Sample Run 
This shows that the fuzzy bidding strategy is more effective than the other 
strategy. It is assumed that the regulation bidders would bid their true energy generation 
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costs, and that their capacity reservation bids  would reflect the corresponding 
opportunity costs. 
iR
Figure 6.7 shows the variation of the price values for Bidder-2 with application of 
the fuzzy strategy in the first sample run, and without the fuzzy strategy in second sample 
run.  
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                 Figure 6.7: Plot of price changes for bidder-2 in sample runs 
 
Figure 6.8 shows similar variation for Bidder-3 without application of fuzzy 
strategy in first sample run, and with application of fuzzy strategy in second sample run. 
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              Figure 6.8: Plot of price changes for bidder-2 in sample runs 
 
6.4 Power System Simulation and NERC Compliance 
The test system adopted is a three-area system as shown in figure 6.1 earlier with 
the given Gencos and Discos. Control area-2 with five Gencos is considered for the 
regulation auction market. They are equivalent with the five Supplier Agents in the 
auction market with corresponding parameters. The participation of the generators in 
area-2 is shown in figure 6.9. The Simulink model for the power system and the results of 
the simulation are shown in Appendix A. It is observed that the participating factors of 
the generators enabled them to contribute correspondingly to the regulation service and 
the system is compliant with NERC’s performance standards as shown by the plots for 
CPS1 and CPS2 in Appendix A.  
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M ODEL SHOWING PART ICIPAT ION FACT ORS alpha() 
1
del f2
1
0.5835s+0.75
generator
In1 Out1
T urbine5
In1 Out1
T urbine4
In1 Out1
T urbine3
In1 Out1
T urbine2
In1 Out1
T urbine1
Scope
Out1
Pd 2
In1 Out1
Governor5
In1 Out1
Governor4
In1 Out1
Governor3
In1 Out1
Governor2
In1 Out1
Governor1
0.2331
1/R2
2
delPtie2
1
delPc2
 
alpha(5)
alpha5
alpha(4)
alpha4
alpha(3)
alpha3
alpha(2)
alpha2
alpha(1)
alpha1
Figure 6.9: Model showing area-2 with the parameters from the market 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
An implementation has been done for the regulation service auction market using 
software agent technology. The Java-based multi-agent platform Madkit has been 
successfully used to implement competitive procurement of regulation power by the ISO 
from the suppliers. A test auction set up having five bidders has been considered for 
study of the auction mechanism as well as a couple of bidding strategies employed by the 
agents to increase their profit from the market. Simulation results indicate that the fuzzy 
bidding strategy provides more effective market catch for the bidder than the random 
number strategy.  
The participation factors of the generators obtained from this market have been 
used for simulating a sample three-area power system compliant with NERC control 
performance standards using a fuzzy logic controller that modifies the gain of a PID 
controller. Further study in terms of auction mechanism and bidding strategies would 
provide better insight into the techniques and market behavior of such automated multi 
agent-based systems. 
7.2 Recommendations for future work 
The initial enhancement over this work would be to implement more bidding 
strategies. The fuzzy inference system could be expanded with another variable reflecting 
the time of the day during which the auction takes place viz., peak time or off-peak time. 
This would enable more precise decisions from the fuzzy system since it would be wise 
to increase the bid price when there would be good demand for the commodity. The next 
 49
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
step would be to implement optimization techniques to improve the functioning of the 
ISO as well as bidding agents. The ISO could work on minimizing a cost function and/or 
maximizing a social welfare function while the supplier agents work on maximizing their 
profit functions.  
Also, double auctions could be implemented with Consumer agents trying to buy 
regulation power from the ISO as well as trying to enter into bilateral contracts with 
Supplier agents thereby reducing the available capacity. Also, similar auctions can be 
implemented for the other ancillary services like spinning reserves and replacement 
reserves. 
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APPENDIX A 
SIMULINK MODELS AND RESULTS OF SIMULATION 
simulation timeMODEL OF TEST SYSTEM WITH THREE AREAS
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Figure A.1: Simulink model of the sample three area system 
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Figure A.2: Simulink model of the fuzzy controller in the system 
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Figure A.3: NERC CPS1 compliance of area-2  
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Figure A.4: NERC CPS2 compliance of area-2  
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Figure A.5: Area Control Error (ACE) signal of area-2 
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Figure A.6: Fuzzy Controller Output signal for area-2 
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% INITIALIZATION FOR THE PARAMETERS IN THE THREE AREA SYSTEM IN MATLAB 
%MACHINE PARAMETERS 
beta1 = 1.68; 
beta2 = 1.9155; 
beta3 = 1.6934; 
betaSUM = 5.2885; 
H1 = 6; 
H2 = 3.5; 
H3 = 10; 
% NERC PARAMETERS 
e10 = 0.64/1000;             
e1 =  6.2/1000;          
L10(1)= sqrt(beta1*betaSUM)*1.65*e10; 
L10(2)= sqrt(beta2*betaSUM)*1.65*e10; 
L10(3) = sqrt(beta3*betaSUM)*1.65*e10; 
tg1 = 35 ; % time constant for supplier i 
tg2 = 30 ; 
tg3 = 25 ; 
%FUZZY SYSTEM INITIALIZATION 
proj1matrix = readfis('proj1.fis'); 
fprintf('\n Initialization Completed'); 
return; 
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APPENDIX B 
GLOSSARY 
1. Energy Auction System is defined as a central auction mechanism, which 
provides trading opportunities to the market participants and maintains reliability 
of operation by coordinating generation, transmission, and distribution functions. 
2. Supportive Services are the services used for supporting a reliable delivery of 
electric energy in power system operation. 
3. Regulation Reserve is the unused capacity of generation that can be made 
available for use within a period of 10 minutes. 
4. Load Following is defined as the amount of electric energy provided to maintain 
the contracted tie line flow and frequency in power system operation during the 
trading period. The load following energy is required to respond in 5-10 minutes 
of time frame. 
5. Forward Market is the trading place where short-term transactions (hourly or 
daily transactions) take place. 
6. Futures Market is the trading place where long-term transactions (monthly or 
yearly transactions) take place. 
7. Planning Market is the market that would underwrite the usage of assets (such 
as transmission lines) to very long-term commitments (15-20 years or more). 
8. Swap Market is the clearinghouse that allows contracts to be terminated with an 
exchange of physical or financial substitution. 
9. Market Clearing Price is a price at which all valuations of the commodity are in 
equilibrium. In the regulation auction, it is the highest price in the energy stack 
that clears the forecasted demand value. 
10. Control Area is an electric system or systems, bound by interconnection 
metering and telemetry, capable of controlling generation to maintain its 
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interchange schedule with other control areas and contributing to frequency 
regulation of the interconnection. 
11. Day-ahead Market is the market involving trading of multi-hour energy blocks 
for delivery during the following day. There can be off-peak market and on-peak 
market for trading to supply during the off-peak and on-peak hours respectively 
during the next day. 
12. Operating Reserve is that generating capability over and above the system 
demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, forced and 
unscheduled outages and local area protection. It consists of spinning and non-
spinning reserve. It relates to the short-term ability to meet a given load. 
13. Spot Market is a market where good are traded for immediate delivery. 
14. Strike Price is the price at which the underlying options contract is bought and 
sold in the event the option is exercised. 
15. Installed Capacity Reserve relates to the long-term ability of the system to meet 
the expected demand requirements. It is the capacity that must be planned and 
constructed in advance to provide for uncertainties in the forecast of demand, and 
unplanned or unscheduled generation outages. 
16. Area Control Error (ACE) is a measure of instantaneous imbalance between 
actual and scheduled generation and demand taking into account energy 
exchanges with other control areas. 
17. Outage refers to the removal of a generating unit from service in order to be 
replaced or serviced as a result of a failure. Such events can compromise the 
ability of the system to supply the load and affect system reliability. A forced 
outage results from emergency conditions requiring the unit to be taken out of 
service immediately, while a scheduled outage results when a unit is deliberately 
taken out of service for service or preventive maintenance. 
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APPENDIX C 
SOURCE CODE FOR AGENT PROGRAMS 
C.1 Program ISO.JAVA  
THIS PROGRAM IS USED TO SIMULATE THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ISO 
CONTROLLER IN THE COMPETITIVE AUCTION FOR REGULATION SERVICE. 
IT OBTAINS THE BID PRICES FROM THE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS,  
BUILDS THE ENERGY STACK AND DETERMINES THE MARKET CLEARING 
PRICE AND SUBSEQUENT ALLOCATIONS TO SUCCESSFUL BIDDERS. 
IT ALSO INTERFACES WITH THE MATLAB ENVIRONMENT. 
*/ 
//package demo.agents.power; 
 
import madkit.kernel.*; 
import madkit.lib.graphics.*; 
import madkit.lib.messages.ACLMessage;  
 
import java.awt.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.awt.event.*; 
import java.util.*; 
 
import javax.swing.*;  
 
/* CONTAINS THE BID OF A SUPPLIER. THIS CLASS IS USED BY THE ISO  
   TO STORE THE PARAMETERS OF THE BIDDERS AND TO OBTAIN THE MCP 
   FROM THE BIDS OF THE SUPPLIERS */ 
class BidAnswer { 
 AgentAddress bidder; 
 double value; 
 double ramp; 
 double alloc; 
 double reward; 
 BidAnswer(AgentAddress b, double v) 
 { 
  bidder = b;  
  value = v;  
  ramp = 0.0;  
  alloc=0.0; 
  reward = 0.0; 
 } 
 double getValue(){return value;} 
 void setRamp(double r){ramp = r;} 
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 void setAlloc(double s){alloc = s;} 
 void setReward(double r){reward = r;} 
 double getRamp(){return ramp;} 
 double getAlloc(){return alloc;} 
 double getReward(){return reward;} 
 AgentAddress getBidder(){return bidder;} 
} 
/* THE ISO CLASS PERFORMS THE ROLE OF THE ISO CONTROLLER IN THE 
   REGULATION SERVICE AUCTION. IT RECEIVES THE BID PRICES FROM  
   THE BIDDERS FOR EACH HOUR, BUILDS THE ENERGY STACK AND FINDS 
   THE MARKET CLEARING PRICE. IT ALSO DISPATCHES THE ALLOCATIONS  
   TO THE UNITS AND INITIATES THE INTERFACE WITH MATLAB. 
*/ 
public class ISO extends Agent implements ActionListener 
{ 
  int flag = 0; 
  String product = "utility"; 
  int auction_count; 
  BidAnswer[] answers; 
  BidAnswer[] sorted_answers; 
  static AgentAddress[] bidders,price_agent; 
  int contract = 0; 
  JButton b; 
  int cpt=0; 
  int cptramp = 0; 
  AgentAddress client; 
  FileWriter fw,reward_file; 
  double reward24[][]; 
  double hour_demand; 
  double demand_for_day[] = {120, 110, 140, 130, 140, 130, 120, 130, 140, 120, 
     110, 140, 130, 120, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 120, 
     110, 130, 140, 120}; 
  static JMatLink engine; 
  double bidprices[][]; 
   
  boolean pause = false; 
   
  public void enterPause() 
    { 
      pause = true; 
      b.setBackground(Color.red); 
      b.repaint(); 
       
      while (pause) 
 pause(200); 
    } 
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 public void initGUI()  
    { 
      JPanel p = new JPanel(new BorderLayout()); 
      OPanel o = new OPanel(); 
      p.add("Center",o); 
       b = new JButton("Next step"); 
      b.addActionListener(this); 
      p.add("South",b); 
      setGUIObject(p); 
      setOutputWriter(o.getOut()); 
    } 
 
  public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e) 
    { 
      pause=false; 
      b.setBackground(Color.gray); 
    } 
   
     
  public void activate() 
    { 
      println("ISO ready"); 
   enterPause(); 
       
      joinGroup("power-suppliers"); 
      requestRole("power-suppliers", "ISO"); 
    } 
   
 
  public void handleMessage(ACLMessage m) 
  {  
 if (m.getAct().equals("ramp")) 
 { 
  receiveRamp(m); 
 } 
 else if (m.getAct().equals("bid")) 
 { 
  receiveBid(m); 
 }; 
  } 
     
  public void live() 
  { 
 println("Opening engine"); 
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 engine = new JMatLink(); 
 engine.engOpen(); 
 engine.engEvalString("fismat=readfis('fuzzybid')"); 
 println("Loaded the Fuzzy Inference System"); 
 pause(3000); 
 
 reward24 = new double[5][24];   
 auction_count = 0; AgentAddress aa2 = null; 
 while (auction_count < 24) 
 {  
  if ( ((auction_count+1)) == 1 | ((auction_count+1) ==21) ) 
  { 
  println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"st hour"); 
  } 
  else if ( ((auction_count+1) == 2) | ((auction_count+1) == 22) ) 
  { 
  println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"nd hour"); 
  } 
  else if ( ((auction_count+1) == 3) | ((auction_count+1) == 23) ) 
  { 
  println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"rd hour"); 
  } 
  else if ( ((auction_count+1) >= 4) | ((auction_count+1) <= 20)   
     | ((auction_count+1) == 24) ) 
  { 
  println("Starting auction for the " + (auction_count+1) +"th hour"); 
  }; 
  pause(10000);     
  //enterPause(); 
  
  bidders=getAgentsWithRole("power-suppliers",    
         product+"-supplier"); 
  
  if (bidders.length==0) 
  { 
   println("Not found providers of " + product); 
   return; 
  } 
  println ("Found "+ bidders.length+" suppliers of power from "+product); 
  cpt = bidders.length; 
  cptramp = cpt; 
  answers = new BidAnswer[cpt]; 
  sorted_answers = new BidAnswer[cpt]; 
   
 // SEND DEMAND VALUE FOR THAT HOUR TO SUPPLIERS 
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  hour_demand = demand_for_day[auction_count]; 
  println("Demand Value for the hour is " + hour_demand); 
  println("Sending Demand Value to Suppliers..."); 
  for(int t1=0; t1<bidders.length;t1++) 
  { 
    aa2 = bidders[t1]; 
sendMessage(aa2, new 
ACLMessage("demand",String.valueOf(hour_demand))); 
  }     
  pause(2000); 
   
 // SEND BID REQUESTS TO SUPPLIERS 
  println ("Sending bid request to all suppliers:"); 
    
  ACLMessage req=new ACLMessage("request-for-bid",product); 
  broadcastMessage("power-suppliers", product+"-supplier",req); 
  
  println ("Waiting for offers.."); 
  pause(8000); 
        while (cpt > 0) 
  { 
   Message m = waitNextMessage(); 
    
    if (m instanceof ACLMessage) 
   handleMessage((ACLMessage)m); 
   else  
     System.err.println("ERROR: invalid message type: "+ m); 
  } 
    
  requestRamp(); 
    
  dispatch(); 
  auction_count++; 
   
 // ACTIVATE THE BIDPRICE AGENT TO SEND CHANGED 
 // BID VALUES TO THE SUPPLIERS 
 
  if (auction_count < 24) 
  { 
   println("Sending message to BidPrice agent..."); 
   ACLMessage req1=new ACLMessage("send-prices",product); 
   broadcastMessage("power-suppliers", product+"-priceagent",req1); 
   
  }; 
 
  if ((auction_count == 23) & (flag == 0)) 
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  { 
      engine.engPutArray("reward24",reward24); 
      println("Reward24 written into Matlab"); 
   println("Thank you for using the agent based auction system.\n"); 
   println("\nRunning the system again for another day.\n"); 
   auction_count = 0; 
   flag = 1; 
   enterPause(); 
  } 
    
 }// FOR THE WHILE AUCTION_COUNT<24 LOOP 
// CODE FOR WRITING THE REWARD24 DATA TO MATLAB FOR  
//  PLOTTING FOR RESULTS 
     engine.engPutArray("reward24",reward24); 
    println("Reward24 written into Matlab"); 
 
 println("Thank you for using the agent based auction system.\n"); 
 println("\nRunning the system again for another day.\n"); 
  }// END BRACES FOR THE LIVE() METHOD 
   
  protected void receiveBid(ACLMessage m) 
  { 
   println("Received an offer " + m.getContent() + " from " + m.getSender()); 
 cpt--; 
answers[cpt]=new BidAnswer(m.getSender(),((Double) new 
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue()); 
  } 
   
  protected void requestRamp() 
  { 
 println ("Sending ramp-rate request to all suppliers:"); 
    
 ACLMessage req1=new ACLMessage("request-for-ramp",product); 
     broadcastMessage("power-suppliers", product+"-supplier",req1); 
  
 println ("Waiting for Ramp-rate values.."); 
 pause(8000); 
 while (cptramp > 0) 
 { 
  Message m1 = waitNextMessage(); 
  if (m1 instanceof ACLMessage) 
   handleMessage((ACLMessage)m1); 
  else  
   System.err.println("ERROR1: invalid message type: "+ m1); 
 } 
  } 
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  protected void receiveRamp(ACLMessage m) 
  { 
 println("Received Ramp value from " + m.getSender()); 
 cptramp--; 
 for (int q = 0; q < answers.length; q++) 
 { 
  if (answers[q].getBidder() == m.getSender()) 
  { 
double d1 = ((Double) new 
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue(); 
  answers[q].setRamp(d1); 
  } 
 }; 
  } 
 
  void dispatch() 
    { 
      AgentAddress aa = null, aa1 = null; 
      sorted_answers = answers; 
   BidAnswer temp; 
      println("Selecting offers from " + sorted_answers.length + " proposals"); 
      pause(4000); 
  // SORT THE BID ANSWERS OBJECTS ACCORDING TO BID PRIX VALUE 
   for (int i=0; i<sorted_answers.length;i++) 
   { 
    for (int j=(i+1); j<sorted_answers.length;j++) 
    { 
   double v1 = sorted_answers[i].getValue(); 
   double v2 = sorted_answers[j].getValue(); 
   if (v1 > v2) 
   { 
    temp = sorted_answers[j]; 
    sorted_answers[j] = sorted_answers[i]; 
    sorted_answers[i] = temp; 
   } 
    } 
   } 
  // PRINT OUT THE SORTED BID VALUES 
   for(int t=0; t<sorted_answers.length;t++) 
   { 
    double f = sorted_answers[t].getValue(); 
    AgentAddress add = sorted_answers[t].getBidder(); 
    double f1 = sorted_answers[t].getRamp(); 
    println("\n" + String.valueOf(f)); 
   }; 
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   double Pdsum = 0.0; 
   int k1 = 0; 
   
  // NOW WE HAVE THE SORTED BIDANSWERS NEXT IS ALLOCATION 
   println("Building the Load Stack"); 
   for (int k=0; k < sorted_answers.length; k++) 
   { 
    double v3 = sorted_answers[k].getRamp(); 
    // calculate supply in 5 min.s 
    double s = v3 * 5; 
    Pdsum = Pdsum + s; 
     
    if (Pdsum < hour_demand) 
    { 
    // set the amount of dispatch given for that unit 
     sorted_answers[k].setAlloc(s); 
    // populate the allocation in the unsorted list of bidders 
     aa = sorted_answers[k].getBidder(); 
     for(int q1=0; q1<answers.length;q1++) 
     { 
      aa1 = answers[q1].getBidder(); 
      if (aa == aa1) 
       answers[q1].setAlloc(s); 
     } 
    } 
    else if (Pdsum == hour_demand) 
    { 
     sorted_answers[k].setAlloc(s); 
     aa = sorted_answers[k].getBidder(); 
    // populate the allocation in the unsorted list od bidders 
     for(int q1=0; q1<answers.length;q1++) 
     { 
      aa1 = answers[q1].getBidder(); 
      if (aa == aa1) 
       answers[q1].setAlloc(s); 
     } 
     k1 = k; 
     break; 
    } 
    else if (Pdsum > hour_demand) 
    { 
     double d = Pdsum - hour_demand; 
     sorted_answers[k].setAlloc((s-d)); 
     aa = sorted_answers[k].getBidder(); 
   // POPULATE THE ALLOCATION IN THE UNSORTED LIST OF BIDDERS 
     for(int q1=0; q1<answers.length;q1++) 
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     { 
      aa1 = answers[q1].getBidder(); 
      if (aa == aa1) 
       answers[q1].setAlloc((s-d)); 
     } 
     k1 = k; 
     break; 
    } 
   } 
    
  // DETERMINE THE MARKET CLEARING PRICE  
  // AND SEND IT TO THE SUPPLIERS 
   double MCP = sorted_answers[k1].getValue(); 
   println("MCP value is " + MCP); 
   for(int t1=0; t1<sorted_answers.length;t1++) 
   { 
    aa = sorted_answers[t1].getBidder(); 
    sendMessage(aa, new ACLMessage("mcp",String.valueOf(MCP))); 
   }    
   pause(3000); 
    
  // SEND THE ALLOCATION TO EACH BIDDER 
   for(int t2=0; t2<answers.length;t2++) 
   {     
    aa = answers[t2].getBidder(); 
    double d2 = answers[t2].getAlloc(); 
    double v2 = answers[t2].getValue(); 
     println("Allocation sent for bidder " + aa + "Amount= " + d2); 
    sendMessage(aa, new ACLMessage("alloc",String.valueOf(d2))); 
   
 // FIND THE REWARD FOR THE ALLOCATED BIDDERS FROM MCP,  
//  ALLOCATION, AND PRICE VALUES OF THE BIDDERS  
//  REWARD = (MCP // - PRICE) * ALLOC 
    double r = (MCP - v2) * d2; 
    if (r < 0.0) r = 0.0; 
    answers[t2].setReward(r); 
   }; 
   bidprices = new double[3][5];  
   // WRITE THE DATA AS AN ARRAY IN MATLAB 
   // NOW WE OUTPUT THE BID PRICES OF THE BIDDERS 
   // FIRST ROW OF BIDPRICES IS PRICE VALUES 
   // SECOND ROW IS REWARD VALUES 
   // third row is the choice of the bidder for strategy 
    for (int t3=0; t3<bidders.length; t3++) 
    { 
   for(int t2=0; t2<answers.length;t2++) 
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   {     
   aa = answers[t2].getBidder(); 
    if (bidders[t3] == aa) 
    {    
     double d2 = answers[t2].getReward(); 
     double d3 = answers[t2].getValue(); 
     reward24[t3][auction_count] = d2; 
     bidprices[0][t3] = d3; 
    }; 
   }; 
    }; 
   // NOW OUTPUT THE REWARD VALUES OF THE BIDDERS  
    for (int t3=0; t3<bidders.length; t3++) 
    { 
   for(int t2=0; t2<answers.length;t2++) 
   {     
   aa = answers[t2].getBidder(); 
    if (bidders[t3] == aa) 
    {    
     double d2 = answers[t2].getReward(); 
     bidprices[1][t3] = d2; 
    }; 
   }; 
    };   
  
   // Now Output The Selected Bidding Strategy Of The Bidders  
    for (int t4=0; t4<bidders.length; t4++) 
    { 
   bidprices[2][t4] = 0.0; 
    } 
    // implement the FIS strategy for the second bidder 
         //bidprices[2][1] = 1.0; 
    if (flag == 0) 
   { 
    bidprices[2][1] = 1.0; 
   } 
    else 
   { 
    bidprices[2][2] = 1.0;   
   } 
  // PUT BIDPRICES ARRAY INTO MATLAB WORKSPACE 
   engine.engPutArray("bidprices",bidprices); 
   println("Matlab written with array"); 
     }// FOR DISPATCH() METHOD 
}// FOR ISO.JAVA 
*********************************************************************** 
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C.2 Program SUPPLIER.JAVA 
THIS PROGRAM IS USED FOR SIMULATING THE SUPPLIER AGENT IN THE 
REGULATION AUCTION. IT GENERATES THE CAPACITY RESERVATION BID 
AND THE ENERGY BID, ADDS THEM AND SUBMITS THE RESULT TO THE  
ISO AGENT AS THE BID PRICE FOR EVERY HOUR OF AUCTION.  
IT PROCURES THE NEW PRICE FROM THE BID PRICE AGENT BEFORE THE  
NEXT AUCTION EVERYTIME AFTER THE FIRST HOUR. 
*/ 
//package demo.agents.power; 
import java.awt.*; 
import java.net.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import madkit.kernel.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import javax.swing.*; 
 
import madkit.lib.messages.ACLMessage;  
 
public class Supplier extends Agent 
{ 
  double prix = 0.0; 
  //alpha value 
  double alpha = 0.0; 
  // beta value  
  double beta = 0.0; 
  // gamma value 
  double gamma = 0.0; 
  // ramp-rate value for the supplier 
  double ramp = 0.0; 
  // unloaded capacity available with the supplier 
  double unload = 0.0; 
  double Ei = 0.0; 
  double Ri = 0.0; 
  double rand = 0.0; 
  double rand1 = 0.0; 
  double MCP = 0.0; 
  double demand; 
  String competence; 
  JLabel message,price1; 
   
 
  public Supplier() 
  { 
 // generate random number and populate 
 // supplier parameters 
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 rand = Math.random(); 
 competence = "utility";  
 if (rand >= 0.0 & rand < 0.1) 
 { 
  alpha = 78.0; 
  beta = 7.97;  
  gamma = 0.005820; 
  ramp = 6; 
  unload = 124.4; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.1 & rand < 0.2) 
 { 
  alpha = 75.9; 
  beta = 8.69;  
  gamma = 0.001750; 
  ramp = 8; 
  unload = 165; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.2 & rand < 0.3) 
 { 
  alpha = 76.9; 
  beta = 7.92;  
  gamma = 0.001562; 
  ramp = 7; 
  unload = 155.53; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.3 & rand < 0.4) 
 { 
  alpha = 75.5; 
  beta = 7.68;  
  gamma = 0.002394; 
  ramp = 9; 
  unload = 108.19; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.4 & rand < 0.5) 
 { 
  alpha = 77.8; 
  beta = 7.85;  
  gamma = 0.008940; 
  ramp = 8; 
  unload = 93.02; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.5 & rand < 0.6) 
 { 
  alpha = 75.9; 
  beta = 6.34;  
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  gamma = 0.002394; 
  ramp = 9; 
  unload = 135.0; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.6 & rand < 0.7) 
 { 
  alpha = 78.0; 
  beta = 8.88; 
  gamma = 0.05572; 
  ramp = 7; 
  unload = 98.0; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.7 & rand < 0.8)   
 { 
  alpha = 76.8; 
  beta = 9.71;  
  gamma = 0.002820; 
  ramp = 8; 
  unload = 180.0; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.8 & rand < 0.9) 
 { 
  alpha = 75.5; 
  beta = 7.97;  
  gamma = 0.005820; 
  ramp = 10; 
  unload = 175.53; 
 }; 
 if (rand >= 0.9) 
 { 
  alpha = 77.8; 
  beta = 8.69; 
  gamma = 0.001750; 
  ramp = 6; 
  unload = 130.5; 
 }; 
  
 // MARGINAL COST PER ENERGY UNIT  
 // MCI = EI = B + C * PG 
 // THIS IS THE ENERGY BID EI 
 Ei = beta + ( (2 * gamma) * unload); 
  
 // POWER VALUE FOR OPPORTUNITY GENERATION FOR 5 MINS 
 double opp_Pg = ramp * 5; 
  
 // CAPACITY BID PRICE RI FOR THE BIDDING SUPPLIER 
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 //RI = BETA + (2 * (GAMMA * OPP_PG); 
 Ri = beta + (2 * (gamma * opp_Pg)); 
  
 // PUT THE VALUE TO THE INITIAL VALUE FOR PRODUCTION 
 // BY THE SUPPLIER 
 prix = Ri + Ei; 
 
  } 
   
  public void initGUI() 
  { 
    JPanel p= new JPanel(); 
    p.setLayout(new BoxLayout(p,BoxLayout.Y_AXIS));  
     
 // add the bid price to the GUI  
 p.add(price1 = new JLabel("Price: "+ prix)); 
 p.add( new JLabel("Ramp: " + ramp)); 
 p.add( new JLabel("Ei: " + Ei)); 
 p.add( new JLabel("Ri: " + Ri)); 
 
    p.add(message = new JLabel("                             ")); 
    message.setOpaque(true); 
    p.setSize(170,100); 
    message.setBackground(Color.lightGray); 
     
    setGUIObject(p); 
  } 
 
 
  public void activate() 
    { 
      joinGroup("power-suppliers"); 
      requestRole("power-suppliers",competence+"-supplier"); 
      display("Power: "+competence); 
    } 
 
  public void display(String s) 
  { 
    if (hasGUI()) 
      message.setText(s); 
    else 
      println(s); 
  } 
  public void display_price(String s) 
  { 
    if (hasGUI()) 
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      price1.setText(s); 
    else 
      println(s); 
  } 
 
  protected void handleMessage(ACLMessage m) 
  { 
    Color bkg=message.getBackground(); 
    // RESPONSE FOR REQUEST FOR BID MESSAGE FROM ISO 
    if (m.getAct().equals("request-for-bid")) 
    { 
  debug("s"+m.getSender()); 
  debug("r"+m.getReceiver()); 
       display("Sending bid"); 
  pause(4000); 
       message.setBackground(Color.yellow); 
        
  // send the bid value to the ISO 
       sendMessage(m.getSender(),  
    new ACLMessage("bid",String.valueOf(prix))); 
  display("Bid value sent"); 
  pause(2000); 
   
  display_price("Price: "+ prix); 
       message.setBackground(Color.lightGray); 
       display("Power: "+competence); 
    } 
 // RESPONSE FOR REQUEST FOR RAMP MESSAGE FROM ISO 
 else if (m.getAct().equals("request-for-ramp")) 
 { 
  debug("s"+m.getSender()); 
  debug("r"+m.getReceiver()); 
       display("Sending ramp"); 
  pause(4000); 
       message.setBackground(Color.yellow); 
   
  // send the ramp value to the ISO 
  sendMessage(m.getSender(),  
    new ACLMessage("ramp",String.valueOf(ramp))); 
  display("Ramp value sent"); 
       pause(2000); 
  message.setBackground(Color.lightGray); 
       display("Power: "+competence); 
 } 
    // RESPONSE FOR MARKET CLEARING PRICE MESSAGE FROM ISO 
 else if (m.getAct().equals("mcp")) 
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 { 
  MCP = ((Double) new Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue(); 
  display("MCP value received: " + MCP); 
 } 
    // RESPONSE FOR MESSAGE WITH NEW PRICE  
 // OBTAINED USING THE BIDDING STRATEGY  
 // USING MATLAB FROM BIDPRICE AGENT 
 else if (m.getAct().equals("newprice")) 
 { 
  // Check for condition for no loss to supplier in  
  // the auction 
  double temp; 
  temp = ((Double) new Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue(); 
  if (temp < Ri) 
  { 
   prix = Ri; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   prix = temp; 
  } 
  display_price("Price: "+ prix); 
       display("New price received"); 
  message.setBackground(Color.yellow); 
  pause(2000); 
  message.setBackground(Color.lightGray); 
       display("Power: "+competence); 
 } 
    // RESPONSE FOR MESSAGE WITH FORECASTED  
 // DEMAND VALUE FROM ISO 
 else if (m.getAct().equals("demand")) 
 { 
  demand = ((Double) new 
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue(); 
  display("Demand value received: " + demand); 
 } 
    // response for message with allocation from ISO 
 else if (m.getAct().equals("alloc")) 
 { 
  double a = ((Double) new 
Double(m.getContent().toString())).doubleValue(); 
  // Calculate the participation 
  double p = a/demand; 
   
  // calculate and display the reward 
  pause(1000); 
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  double reward =  (MCP - prix) * a; 
  display("Reward " + reward); 
 } 
  }// end of handleMessage() method  
 
   
  public void live() 
    { 
      while (true) { 
  Message m = waitNextMessage(); 
    if (m instanceof ACLMessage) 
      handleMessage((ACLMessage)m); 
 
  } 
    } 
} 
 
*********************************************************************** 
C.3 Program BIDPRICE.JAVA 
THIS PROGRAM IS USED TO PROCURE THE NEW BID PRICES FROM  
MATLAB THE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS ACCORDING TO THE STRATEGY 
EMPLOYED BY EACH OF THE PARTICIPATING BIDDERS, AND PASSES 
THE VALUES AS MESSAGES TO THE RESPECTIVE SUPPLIER AGENTS. 
*/ 
 
//package demo.agents.power; 
import java.awt.*; 
import java.net.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import madkit.kernel.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import javax.swing.*; 
 
import madkit.lib.messages.ACLMessage;  
 
public class BidPrice extends Agent 
{ 
  double rand = 0.0; 
  double rand1 = 0.0; 
  double MCP = 0.0; 
  double demand; 
  double new_prices[][]; 
  String competence; 
  JLabel message,price1; 
  FileReader fr; 
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  BufferedReader br; 
   
  public BidPrice() 
  { 
   competence = "utility"; 
  } 
   
  public void initGUI() 
  { 
    JPanel p1= new JPanel(); 
    p1.setLayout(new BoxLayout(p1,BoxLayout.Y_AXIS));  
    p1.add(message = new JLabel("                             ")); 
    message.setOpaque(true); 
    p1.setSize(170,100); 
    message.setBackground(Color.lightGray); 
     
    setGUIObject(p1); 
  } 
 
  public void activate() 
    { 
      joinGroup("power-suppliers"); 
      requestRole("power-suppliers",competence+"-priceagent"); 
      display("Power: "+"price-agent"); 
    } 
 
  public void display(String s) 
  { 
    if (hasGUI()) 
      message.setText(s); 
    else 
      println(s); 
  } 
   
  protected void handleMessage(ACLMessage m) 
  { 
    Color bkg=message.getBackground(); 
 String s=""; 
    // OBTAIN REQUEST FOR BID MESSAGE FROM ISO 
    if (m.getAct().equals("send-prices")) 
    { 
  debug("s"+m.getSender()); 
  debug("r"+m.getReceiver()); 
       message.setBackground(Color.yellow); 
   
 // INTERFACE WITH MATLAB AND RUN ROUTINE 
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 // price_change.m 
  ISO.engine.engEvalString("price_change"); 
  display("Finding new prices..."); 
  pause(500); 
   
 // OBTAIN THE NEW PRICES ARRAY FROM MATLAB   
  new_prices = ISO.engine.engGetArray("curr_prices"); 
  display("current prices received"); 
  pause(500); 
  
 // SEND THE NEW BID VALUES TO THE SUPPLIERS 
     AgentAddress aa2; 
  for(int t1=0; t1<ISO.bidders.length;t1++) 
  { 
    aa2 = ISO.bidders[t1]; 
sendMessage(aa2, new 
ACLMessage("newprice",String.valueOf(new_prices[0][t1]))); 
    pause(500); 
  }   
  display("New Bid values sent"); 
  pause(2000); 
  
  message.setBackground(Color.lightGray); 
       display("Power: "+"price-agent"); 
    } 
  } 
  
  public void live() 
    { 
      while (true) { 
  Message m = waitNextMessage(); 
    if (m instanceof ACLMessage) 
      handleMessage((ACLMessage)m); 
 
  } 
    } 
} 
*********************************************************************** 
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